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Under the Sun: Casebooks and the Future of
Contracts Teaching
Thomas W. Joo*
What is the future of the casebook in legal education? It is tempting and fashionable
to blame the current woes of law schools on their supposedly “outdated” educational
practices, such as casebooks. As this Article shows, however, most of the current
criticisms of casebooks and the case method are perennial ones. This does not render
the critiques invalid, but it does undermine the notion that they reveal a contemporary
crisis in legal education. Indeed, they are not even specific to legal education. Rather,
they reflect fundamental tensions in the learning of any field: theory versus practice,
general understanding versus specific technical knowledge. By saying that there is
nothing truly new in these criticisms, I do not mean to say that proposals for reform
are futile or ill-advised. It is simply that there is nothing new under the sun, in legal
education or anywhere else. Legal education has gone back and forth on these
matters, and will continue to do so, and that is probably as it should be.

* Professor, UC Davis School of Law. This Article was prepared for a Hastings College of the
Law Symposium in honor of Charles Knapp’s fiftieth year of law teaching. I would like to thank
Hastings, the organizers and attendees of the conference, and of course Chuck Knapp, a leading
scholar, teacher, and mentor in the field of contracts. I would also like to thank the UC Davis School
of Law for its financial support of this research.
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Introduction
The thing that hath been, it is that which shall be; and that which is done
is that which shall be done: and there is no new thing under the sun.
—Ecclesiastes 1:9 (King James).

I am optimistic about the prospect of teaching contracts through
casebooks. In light of the current mania for “disruptive innovation,” it is
tempting and fashionable to blame the current woes of law schools on their
supposedly “outdated” educational practices, such as casebooks. But the
slack demand for legal education in recent years is unlikely to be a sign of
a crisis in the quality or relevance of legal education. More likely, it is
driven by the lack of demand for lawyers. Law firms were hiring huge
numbers of graduates at princely salaries less than a decade ago; it seems
implausible that legal education has undergone a wholesale decline in
quality or relevance since then. A quick look at the history of legal
education shows that most of the current criticisms of the case method
have appeared before. Formal legal education generally, and the case
method in particular, arose in direct response to the perception that legal
training was too tied to routine law practice. For over a century, the case
method has been both praised for its practical value and ridiculed for
lacking such value (the most common criticism of legal education today).
Like anything, casebooks and case-based teaching could be improved.
But I believe they are far more useful and less hidebound than many of
their critics would have you believe.
Indeed, other countries continue to look to U.S. legal education as
1
the model for reforming their own institutions. In many countries, U.S.
legal education has literally become part of legal education. Afghanistan,
for example, has recognized that educating lawyers in the United States
and other countries is a faster route to rebuilding the profession than
2
remaking domestic legal education. Foreign law graduates have long
1. See, e.g., Carole Silver, Book Review, 61 J. Legal Educ. 691, 691 (2012) (reviewing Legal
Education in Asia: Globalization, Change and Contexts (Stacey Steele & Kathryn Taylor eds., 2011)).
2. Id. at 694 (citing Veronica Taylor, Legal Education as Development, in Legal Education in
Asia: Globalization, Change and Contexts, supra note 1, at 216, 223).
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sought advanced degrees in the United States, and in recent years, many
Chinese nationals have chosen to pursue law degrees in the United States
3
and return to China to practice as “foreign-qualified lawyers.” Many
foreign nationals see a U.S. legal degree as training that qualifies them to
compete on the global level, and they see U.S. training as more practice
oriented. In UC Davis’s International Commercial Law LL.M. program, I
have taught many experienced practitioners with law degrees from many
different countries. I teach U.S. corporations law using the same casebook
I use for my J.D. classes. The students—or more to the point, lawyers—
often comment that the U.S. teaching style is more grounded in practical
application than that in their home countries.
As we shall see, many of the contemporary criticisms of American
legal education, and the case method in particular, have been made
periodically since the earliest days of the modern law school. This does
not mean the critiques are invalid, but they are not specific to any
contemporary crisis, the “digital age,” or the “new economy.” Indeed, they
are not even specific to legal education. Rather, they reflect fundamental
tensions in the learning of any field: theory versus practice, general
understanding versus specific technical knowledge. Some degree of each
is necessary. Moreover, there is no ideal point of balance among these
competing and complementary priorities. The feeling of imbalance is
justifiable, and intractable. By saying that there is nothing truly new in these
criticisms, I do not mean to say that proposals for reform are futile or illadvised. It is simply that there is nothing new under the sun, in legal
education or anywhere else. Legal education has gone back and forth on
these matters, and will continue to do so, and that is probably as it should
be.

I. Theory Versus Practice
4
Critics of contemporary legal education often cite the 2007 Carnegie
Report, which argued that law schools focus too heavily on doctrinal
5
analysis and not enough on lawyering skills or ethics. Casebooks, of course,
are far better suited to teaching the former than the latter. The tension
between theory and practice in legal education is a constant—as is the
anxiety about this tension among legal educators, students, and the bar.
Indeed, the 2007 Carnegie Report is only the most recent in a century of
reports (primarily from the Carnegie Foundation) grappling with this
issue. The current concern about a lack of practical training also
appeared, for example, in the American Bar Association’s (“ABA”)
3. Id. (citing Taylor, supra note 2, at 226).
4. See, e.g., Beverly Petersen Jennison, Beyond Langdell: Innovating in Legal Education, 62 Cath.
U. L. Rev. 643 (2013).
5. William M. Sullivan et al., Carnegie Found. for the Advancement of Teaching, Educating
Lawyers: Preparation for the Profession of Law 56 (2007).
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6

MacCrate Report in 1992, and in an earlier report by the Carnegie
7
Foundation, the 1921 Reed Report.
Prior to modern academic legal education, lawyers trained through
apprenticeships in law offices before admission to the bar. William
Blackstone criticized this approach, arguing unless an apprentice is
educated “in the elements and first principles upon which the rule of
practice is founded, the least variation from established precedents will
8
totally distract and bewilder him.” When academic law professorships
were first introduced in U.S. colleges in the late 1700s, they were designed to
provide the theoretical foundation for apprenticeships that Blackstone had
9
recommended.
The Langdellian case method, and the casebook, arose as part of a
movement to emphasize the academic character of law schools. Prior to
the Langdellian case method, professors in law, as in other disciplines,
10
educated students through lectures or textbooks. Dean Christopher
Columbus Langdell introduced the case method at Harvard Law School
in 1870, but it did not begin to spread to other schools until around
11
1890. By 1914, a majority of American law schools had adopted some
12
version of the case method. That year, the Carnegie Foundation
commissioned a report on the case method. Because of continuing
disagreement among U.S. academics over the case method, the Carnegie
Foundation asked Josef Redlich, a professor at the University of Vienna,
13
to conduct the study.
Redlich’s report praised the case method for teaching practical
lawyering skills. Some U.S. lawyers then, as now, criticized the case
14
method as “too academic, too ‘transcendental.’” Redlich, however,
thought it was practical and useful, and more “scientific” than traditional
15
methods because of its empirical grounding in actual decisions. He
6. Am. Bar Ass’n, Section of Legal Educ. & Admissions to the Bar, Legal Education and
Professional Development—An Educational Continuum, Report of the Task Force on Law Schools
and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap (1992), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
publications/misc/legal_education/2013_legal_education_and_professional_development_maccrate_report).a
uthcheckdam.pdf.
7. Alfred Z. Reed, Carnegie Found. for the Advancement of Teaching, Training for the Public
Profession of the Law: Historical Development and Principal Contemporary Problems of Legal
Education in the United States, With Some Account of Conditions in England and Canada (1921).
8. A. Benjamin Spencer, The Law School Critique in Historical Perspective, 69 Wash. & Lee L.
Rev. 1949, 1963 (2012) (quoting 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *32).
9. Id. at 196465.
10. Bruce A. Kimball, The Proliferation of Case Method Teaching in American Law Schools: Mr.
Langdell’s Emblematic “Abomination,” 18901915, 46 Hist. of Educ. Q. 192, 19495 (2006).
11. Id. at 20203.
12. Josef Redlich, Carnegie Found. for the Advancement of Teaching, The Common Law
and the Case Method in American University Law Schools vii (1914).
13. Id. at vi. Redlich spent a total of two months visiting ten U.S. law schools.
14. Id. at vii.
15. Id.
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thought case-method students were better prepared for practice than
16
those from European law schools or those from other U.S. law schools.
In Redlich’s view, the case method,
really teaches the pupil to think in the way that any practical lawyer—
whether dealing with written or with unwritten law—ought to and has
to think. It . . . mak[es] the law pupil familiar with the law through
incessant practice in the analysis of law cases, where the concepts,
principles, and rules of Anglo-American law are recorded not as dry
abstractions but as cardinal realities in the inexhaustibly rich,
17
ceaselessly fluctuating social and economic life of man.

In fact, early critics of the case method argued both that the case method
18
was excessively theoretical and that it was too practical. The latter
criticism was apparently based on the belief that lawyers would engage in
the “mindless collection of precedents in an attempt to win judgments for
their clients based only on the assumed weight of the collected cases, rather
19
than appeal to the principles of the common law.” In other words, the
study of cases provides fuel for advocacy, but not understanding of the law.
In 1921, another Carnegie Foundation report, this one by Alfred Reed,
criticized the lack of real-life practical training in U.S. law schools. As
noted above, most law schools followed the case method by this time, but
not all lawyers went to law school; many received their training through
20
the traditional apprenticeship method. Most states permitted law school
as a substitute for apprenticeship, but few states required formal legal
21
education for bar admission. The Reed Report recognized the emergence
of three kinds of law schools: scholarly schools, schools focused on local
practice, and part-time night schools:
The scholarly law school dean properly seeks to build up a ‘nursery for
judges’ that will make American law what American law ought to be.
The practitioner bar examiner . . . properly seeks to prepare students
for the immediate practice of the law as it is. The night school
authorities, finally, see most clearly that the interests not only of the
individual but of the community demand that participation in the
making and administration of the law shall be kept accessible to
Lincoln’s plain people. All these are worthy ideals. . . . But no single
22
institution, pursuing its special aim, can attain both the others as well.

In this passage, Reed advocated for law schools with a range of
different goals. The ABA, however, seems to have misunderstood Reed

16. Id. at viii.
17. Id.
18. Kimball, supra note 10, at 22526.
19. Id. at 226 (quoting William P. LaPiana, Logic and Experience: The Origin of Modern
American Legal Education, 133 (1994)).
20. Id. at 19798 (“Although many law professors considered the question resolved in their favor
by 1895, the issue remained disputed . . . .”).
21. Spencer, supra note 8, at 1995.
22. Reed, supra note 7, at 418.
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as advocating for law schools with different—that is, lower—educational
23
standards. Thus, the ABA commissioned its own report, intended to
24
protect the “scholarly” law schools from this perceived challenge. The
ABA called for a uniform standard of a three-year law degree following
25
at least two years of college. It also recommended that each school have
a “sufficient number” of full-time instructors (as distinct from legal
26
practitioners) and its own dedicated law library. According to one
observer, “[t]hese requirements all meant to homogenize law schools
around standards that tilted in favor of the national, full-time law
27
schools.” Ironically, given the contemporary bar’s criticisms of the
scholarly law school approach, the ABA played a key role in that model’s
dominance.
This convergence on the scholarly model obviously contributed to the
academic nature of modern lawyer training, including the use of casebooks.
When the case method began to spread from Harvard to other law schools
around 1890, it was bound up with a series of “academic, meritocratic
reforms” that Harvard had also adopted, including:
extending the degree course to three years; requiring a bachelor’s
degree for admission and then selecting among qualified applicants;
conducting written examinations for promotion and graduation;
grading and sequencing the curriculum among first-, second-, and
third-year courses; transforming the library from a textbook repository
into a scholarly resource; and hiring full-time instructors who regarded
the professorate as their career. Case method entailed these
meritocratic reforms because teaching with original sources required
both stronger academic preparation and a much greater time
28
commitment on the part of both students and faculty.

The case method became “emblematic” of “the view that academic merit
defined professional merit,” and the prestige and influence of law schools
continues to derive primarily from the academic qualifications of their
29
professors and students.
The reintegration of hands-on training into law teaching is usually
traced to the late 1960s, when the Ford Foundation began supporting
clinical legal training and the Council on Legal Education for Professional
30
Responsibility began advocating for clinical education. Around the
same time, however, yet another Carnegie report warned against
exclusive reliance on clinical teaching. The report echoed Blackstone’s
23. See Spencer, supra note 8, at 1997.
24. Id. at 199597.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1997.
27. Id.
28. Kimball, supra note 10, at 195.
29. Id. at 198.
30. Judith Welch Wegner, The Carnegie Foundation’s Educating Lawyers: Four Questions for Bar
Examiners, B. Examiner, June 2011, at 11, 16.
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criticism of apprenticeships and, moreover, reflected the continuing
search for balance: “We are also concerned that an anti-intellectual
tendency of clinical education will offer an allure to students and to some
31
faculty members who seek ‘relevance’ at any price.” The report
recommended moderation: “experimentation with many modest ideas,
32
one of which is clinical education.” The basic concept of classroom
education followed by clinical experience is reminiscent of the original
idea of academic legal education as the intellectual foundation for
apprenticeships.

II. Critical Thinking: The Practicality of the Abstract
The concern about balancing the practical and the theoretical is
absolutely appropriate and absolutely intractable. Legal practice itself
involves both abstract ideas and nuts-and-bolts practicalities. Moreover,
the debate between the theoretical and practical in legal education echoes
the fundamental philosophical debate between rule-based and pragmatic
approaches to jurisprudence, legislation, and every kind of legal problem
solving. Balancing the two is a continual and healthy process. It is not a
sign of a new crisis, nor is it a tension that will ever be resolved.
But the distinction between theoretical study and practical skills may
be overdrawn. As Redlich argued, the exercise of extracting principles
33
from decisions is itself a practical skill for a lawyer. More broadly, as
early defenders of the case method argued, the purpose of legal
education is not to teach students the rules of law, but “‘the power of
34
legal reasoning.’”
Even more broadly, the case method is intended to develop
analytical ability and critical thinking skills. According to one recent
study, “[t]he defining feature . . . of the last 30 years has been a
precipitous increase in the wage payoff to jobs requiring synthesis,
35
critical thinking, and deductive and inductive reasoning.” American
colleges and universities, however, may be failing to train students in
such “generic competencies.” Employers complain that few recent
college graduates have excellent skills in critical thinking and problem
36
solving. Longitudinal studies of college students’ critical thinking skills
31. Herbert L. Packer & Thomas Ehrlich, New Directions in Legal Education 46 (1972).
32. Id.
33. Redlich, supra note 12, at viii.
34. Kimball, supra note 10, at 227 (quoting Discussion of Kale’s Paper, in Report of the
Thirtieth Meeting of the American Bar Association 1025 (1907) (comments of James Barr Ames)).
35. Richard Arum & Josipa Roksa, Aspiring Adults Adrift: Tentative Transitions of
College Graduates 19 (2014) (quoting Yujia Liu & David B. Grusky, The Payoff Skill in the Third
Industrial Revolution, 118 Am. J. Soc. 1330, 1332 (2013)).
36. Id. at 19 (citing Jill Casner-Lotto & Linda Barrington, Are They Really Ready to Work?
Employers’ Perspectives on the Basic Knowledge and Applied Skills of New Entrants to the
21st Century U.S. Workforce (2006)).
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have found that those skills do not improve significantly during college.
One study found that “if the CLA [Collegiate Learning Assessment, a
test of job-related critical thinking skills] were rescaled to a one-hundredpoint scale, approximately one-third of students would not improve more
38
than one point over four years of college.”
A recent follow-up study examined students two years after
39
graduation. Those who had scored well on the critical thinking test at
graduation were significantly less likely to be unemployed, less likely to
have lost their jobs, and less likely to be employed in unskilled
40
41
occupations. They also reported greater job satisfaction. Abstract
critical reasoning skills, then, may have material value that presumably
derives from their practical value in the workplace. Law school students,
with their higher GPAs and LSAT scores, are likely to have better
critical thinking skills than the average college graduate. But if critical
thinking is truly underemphasized in college, even these elite students
require (and will benefit from) further training.

III. Context: Forest Versus Trees
A common criticism of casebooks is that they present a set of
discrete, and often disconnected, doctrinal points without the overview
and context that a textbook or treatise might provide. This criticism is
also an old one, dating back at least as far as Redlich’s 1914 Carnegie
42
Report. Redlich noted that under the case method, “the students never
43
obtain a general picture of the law as a whole.” Nor, he noted, did
students get an explanation of basic legal concepts before encountering
44
them in cases. He argued that every area of law uses “certain common
elementary ideas and fundamental legal concepts which the student ought
to be made to understand before he is introduced into the difficult
45
analysis of cases.” According to Redlich, these basic concepts “should
not, as usually occurs to-day, come to the students unsystematically and
unscientifically, as scraps of knowledge more or less assimilated out of

37. See generally Richard Arum & Josipa Roksa, Academically Adrift: Limited Learning on
College Campuses (2011) (reporting results using the Collegiate Learning Assessment); Ernest T.
Pascarella et al., How Robust are the Findings of Academically Adrift?, Change, May/June 2011
(reporting consistent results based on a different measure of critical thinking skills).
38. Arum & Roksa, supra note 35, at 38.
39. Id. at 6061.
40. Id. at 6065 (testing performance did not correlate to higher income, however).
41. Id. at 7677.
42. See generally Redlich, supra note 12.
43. Id. at 41.
44. Id. at 42.
45. Id. (including “choses in action, person and property within the meaning of the law, complaint
and plea, title and stipulation, liability and surety, good faith and fraud”).
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46

law dictionaries and indiscriminate reading of text-books.” Of course,
that is precisely how most of us first learned them, and probably still how
most students learn them today. Redlich argued that law schools should
instead offer overview courses of fundamental legal institutions and
47
principles.
Langdell seems to have disagreed with Redlich on the value of
offering explanation—explanatory material accounted for less than one
48
percent of Langdell’s casebooks. But other early casebook authors did
appreciate the value of textual explanation: precisely what distinguished
the traditional textbook from the casebook. James B. Thayer’s 1892
Cases on Evidence “attended to his readers by expanding the explanatory
commentary in order to help the student understand the cases”—such
49
commentary made up nearly twenty percent of Thayer’s casebook.
While some law schools (including my own) offer introductory
(though not, to my knowledge, final) overview courses like those Redlich
suggested, these offerings do not seem to be comprehensive or well
integrated into the curriculum. Curricular overhaul of that sort is unrealistic
in the foreseeable future. In the meantime, casebooks (and classroom
instructors) should recognize that students lack such background, while
opinions are written for experienced lawyers who have it. Casebooks could
borrow a page from student versions of Shakespeare or the Bible that have
extensive annotations describing antiquated terms. In this respect, digital
casebooks could be useful. For example, clickable pop-up annotations could
reduce visual clutter.
Casebooks could take Redlich’s advice and offer more background
50
and explanation of basic concepts. While including background material
in every introductory casebook might create some redundancy across
multiple courses, that would not necessarily be a bad thing. It would
illustrate and reinforce these fundamentals and underscore their
importance. Repetition in learning is often underestimated in legal
education, where we strain to maximize the breadth of coverage, often
sacrificing retention.

46. Id.
47. Redlich also argued for summary and overview at the end of law school: “lectures which shall
furnish the American law student once more, before he steps out directly into practical legal life, a
certain general summing up and survey of the law.” Id. at 45. He also argued that this summing up and
survey should include a comparative perspective. In this respect, he sounded much like today’s
advocates for comparative law in teaching: “[T]he comparative method would go far to make the
features and characteristics of the native law still clearer to the students, and to deepen their
understanding of their own law through their insight into that of other peoples.” Id.
48. Kimball, supra note 10, at 21718.
49. Id.
50. They could, for example, explain the difference between deciding a motion to dismiss and
rendering a judgment on the merits.
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IV. Cases and Beyond
Even casebooks with significant explanatory material consist
primarily of “cases.” As Jerome Frank noted in the 1930s, however, the
law school “case” method is not actually the study of “cases,” but of
51
appellate opinions. A “case” in a casebook is not a comprehensive case
history, in the sense of the history of a concrete problem. Nor is it a
problem for the student to solve. Rather, it is a court’s (usually an
appellate court’s) disposition of narrow legal issues that constitute one
aspect of a legal dispute. If the “case” more properly refers to the larger
story of the litigants’ problem, an opinion is just one small part of the
“case.”
This characteristic of law school “cases” does not make them
inherently flawed, but it is indicative of the original purpose (and limits)
52
of the Langdellian method: training in inductive reasoning. The
Langdellian notion was that students should not be simply told the
supposed first principles of common law, but should try to induce general
53
principles from examples. Opinions are evidence from which the
student can conclude what the law says; a textbook can only tell you what
the author thinks the law says. The focus on common law induction has
been criticized as outdated since the common law has become relatively
54
unimportant in the age of statutes and administrative law. But the
modern era is not discontinuous with the common law one. The narrow,
incremental nature of common law opinions is extremely influential (for
better or for worse) on the judicial approach to the interpretation of
statutes, and in turn on agency rulemaking and interpretation. A lawyer
attempting to interpret a statute or rule must do so (again, for better or
for worse) in reference to general principles induced from judicial (and
agency) precedent as well as in reference to the text.
Furthermore, the use of opinions in teaching need not be limited to
the induction of common law principles. The opinion can be used to
illustrate the application of a particular legal rule (or, more broadly, the
practice of applying a rule to a set of facts). This use of cases as specific
examples demonstrating general principles is the reverse of what
Langdell intended by his “case method,” which focused on having the
student induce the general legal principle from specific examples. But

51. Jerome Frank, Why Not A Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. Pa. L. Rev. 907, 910 (1933).
52. Edward Rubin, What’s Wrong with Langdell’s Method, and What to Do About It, 60 Vand. L.
Rev. 609, 63435 (2007).
53. See id. at 632–33.
54. See generally id.
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this approach is nearly as old as Langdell’s, and was pioneered at UC
55
Hastings College of the Law, the host of this Symposium.
More problematic than their narrow focus is the fact that appellate
opinions are not representative resolutions of legal problems. Most
litigation issues are not decided on appeal; moreover, most legal problems
do not (or should not) involve litigation at all, but are resolved by advice
56
and planning, drafting, or negotiation. But usefulness of cases is not
limited to teaching the rules of decision in litigation. As an illustrated
statement of a rule (whether common law or statutory), an opinion can
be used for solving a problem whether it be a dispute to be litigated, a
57
negotiation “in the shadow of the law,” or a planning problem. The
facts of an opinion can also be used to illustrate a type of problem, to
58
which the instructor might suggest non-litigation solutions.
For all the limitations of casebooks, perhaps their greatest virtue is
that they require the student to engage with primary sources. Many
entering law students have limited experience with primary sources; they
are more familiar with predigested textbooks and lectures. Casebooks
help students recognize that rules of law do not originate from the
pronouncements of a professor or treatise author, but from primary
59
sources written by people wielding political power and authority. Those
sources are diverse, dispersed, and sometimes unclear or inconsistent.
The question “What is the rule?” often has no answer, and looking at the
primary sources can illustrate that.
Unfortunately, casebooks expose students almost exclusively to one
type of legal source—appellate opinions—but hardly at all to other legal
sources. Frank thought it would be more useful to study “elaborate court
records, including the briefs (and supplemented by reading of text-books
60
as well as upper court opinions).” Of course, time is limited, so it would be
61
impossible to supplement every opinion with “elaborate court records.”
But mere exposure to other legal documents can help reinforce the message
that the law is more than opinions. Some concepts or doctrine could be
taught with documents other than opinions. In my white collar crime
course, for example, I have found that the elements of a crime can be

55. At Hastings in the 1880s, John Pomeroy “assigned cases not inductively but illustratively—to
demonstrate the points already made in his lectures and syllabi.” Kimball, supra note 10, at 208. Many
schools pursued this “illustrative case method” rather than the Langdellian inductive method. Id. at 221.
56. See Rubin, supra note 52, at 653 (“A revised curriculum would benefit students in their
careers by signaling to them that litigation is not necessarily the favored form of legal action.”).
57. See Robert H. Mnookin and Lewis Kornhausert, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L.J. 950 (1979).
58. See infra pp. 912–13.
59. Of course, we leave it to our legal research and writing courses to teach them how to find
these primary sources.
60. Frank, supra note 51, at 916.
61. Id.
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efficiently illustrated using the statutory text and an indictment. An
indictment must allege facts illustrating every element of the crime, while
an appellate opinion will probably address only some elements. Similarly,
the allegations of a complaint for breach of contract might be used to
62
illustrate contract formation and elements of enforceability.
Students also need exposure to non-litigation sources, such as, most
63
obviously, contracts. But I think a little goes a long way. Extensive work
in reading and drafting contracts is not of great use to beginning
students. An actual contract is usually so long, dense, and mystifying that
a first-year student cannot learn much from it. Furthermore, it is difficult
to appreciate the significance of contractual provisions without knowing
both the law and the relevant business context.

V. Instructor, Heal Thyself
Casebooks are typically missing some of the essential pieces of a
complete course, but that is not necessarily grounds for complaint.
Instructors supply most of those missing pieces—as well they should. As
a teacher, I have never expected a casebook to be a complete package of
course materials. Casebooks were certainly not presented to me that way
when I was a student. I was explicitly expected to write case briefs and
compose my own course outlines (and implicitly expected to consult
treatises and even commercial outlines). Most professors made changes
to the book’s organization and distributed at least some supplementary
materials, further conveying the (useful) notions that the casebook was
merely one resource among many, with no special authority, and that
there are many possible ways to structure a course or explain a concept.
Indeed, the primary methods of in-class instruction are Socratic
questioning or free-ranging discussion, methods that few, if any, casebooks
are expressly structured to facilitate. The discussion aspect is value added
to the course by the instructor. By contrast, an undergraduate textbook
might be structured with the expectation that the professor’s lectures will
primarily repeat the same content as the reading (and discussion sections,
not led by the instructor, will consist of answering questions that appear
in the textbook).
The fact that the casebook is not expressly geared to the format of
the class session means much more work for us, but I think that is good
for us as teachers and researchers of the law. Ideally every instructor
would construct her own materials, but, of course, most of our employers
expect us to spend more time on scholarship than on “mere” class
preparation. We should construct at least part of them, however, and not

62. I should disclose here that I have not tried this myself.
63. Private documents such as contracts may be difficult to obtain; however, some statutory
supplements do an admirable job of locating them and making them available.
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expect the book to be a just-add-water “instant” course. That adds to our
understanding of the materials, which hopefully benefits our students.
Furthermore, it means we are adding value to the classroom experience
(or at least are attempting to), rather than simply regurgitating someone
else’s book.
Despite the antiquity of the “case method,” casebooks can be used
to teach useful contemporary lessons. Langdell was motivated by some
antiquated notions, most notably the quaint idea that law is a “natural
64
science,” to which scientific induction could be literally applied. Thus,
we should not credit him with foreseeing the needs of contemporary law
65
students and teachers. But neither should we reject the use of opinions
for this reason. Casebooks need not be, and, as far as I know, generally
are not, used for the purpose of teaching the “scientific” induction of
fundamental truths about law. To the extent they teach inductive
reasoning, it is what might be termed “induction-lite”—trying to find
common themes among multiple decisions. Furthermore, as noted above,
judicial opinions have been used at least since the 1880s for illustrative as
well as inductive purposes—that is, simply to show a rule in action.
Opinions are not limited to common law subjects—they can also be used
to teach “modern” concepts like statutory and rule application and
interpretation.
Teaching from casebooks has practical potential, which Redlich
recognized. The problem is, as the 2007 Carnegie Report recognized, we
as teachers do not always use opinions with a mind to why they are
66
useful. We should explain clearly to students (and remind ourselves as
teachers) that we crunch cases not to memorize things for the exam, but
because it is something that lawyers do. This kind of message—why we study
what we study—probably gets across better when told to the students
than when written in a casebook. In advocating or in formulating legal
advice, a lawyer must manipulate cases, holdings, and doctrine, not
67
memorize them. It is also important to avoid the tendency to ponder
how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. Students excel at posing
fiendishly clever, but outlandish, hypotheticals. I refuse to spend time on
such questions, however, on the grounds that their answers are of no
practical use. Moreover, pondering them means forgetting that we study
law to solve the real problems of real people.

64. Rubin, supra note 52, at 615 (“Our failure to progress paints the Langdellian original with
false colors of modernity, misleading us into thinking that the rationales for this curriculum
correspond to our current understanding of law, society, and education.”).
65. Id.
66. Sullivan et al., supra note 5, at 188 (“One limitation [of legal education] is the casual
attention that most law schools give to teaching students how to use legal thinking in the complexity of
actual law practice.”).
67. Unfortunately, this is very different from what students have to do on the bar exam.
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I emphasize to students that the answer to any legal question means
nothing in the abstract: it only matters insofar as it helps solve (or avoid)
an actual legal problem. Imagine, for example, a contracts exam question
that turns on the enforceability of a written agreement to perform a
major construction project. My exam questions typically ask for a memo
analyzing a specific problem, such as whether your client can enforce the
contract. Student A goes into great detail analyzing whether the
construction cannot be performed within one year from the making of
the agreement, such that it would fall within the state’s statute of frauds.
Student B points out that the contract is fully memorialized in a signed
writing that satisfies the statute, so whether it is within the statute has no
effect on its enforceability. I would give no credit to Student A. Both
students show understanding of contract doctrine, as expressed in the
opinions and statutes we read. But only Student B understands why we
read the opinions and statutes. Student A is playing with doctrine to
answer a question, while failing to recognize that the answer is of no
consequence to the client. As a lawyer, you work for clients, and clients
do not pay lawyers to indulge idle curiosity. In the words of the 2007
Carnegie Report, I want students to think more like lawyers and less like
students; to disabuse them of “the impression that lawyers are more like
competitive scholars than attorneys engaged with the problems of
68
clients.”
The prominence of appellate opinions in casebooks can create the
misimpression that legal practice is—and should be—litigation focused.
The instructor can do much to counteract this without having to change
materials. In contracts, I encourage students to ask whether the case
should even have been brought. In some opinions, the law and facts so
obviously favor one side that the plaintiff should not have brought suit,
or the defendant should have settled rather than wasting time and money
trying to defend herself. In others, the plaintiff wins, but the law limits
recovery such that suit is not worthwhile. I also encourage students to
weigh the value of winning legal remedies against the cost of litigation—
not just attorney fees, but also time and aggravation, as well as the
damage to business relationships. The narratives in legal opinions can
help illustrate these concerns.
Opinions can also be used to teach concrete transactional lessons.
Chaim Saiman gives an excellent example of “reading cases like a
69
transactional lawyer” in Contracts class. He assigns the “traditional
battery” of opinions regarding letters of intent, and identifies the core
issues: whether a document is intended to be binding or nonbinding, the

68. Sullivan et al., supra note 5, at 188.
69. Chaim Saiman, Transactional Lawyering—A Conceptual Approach, 12 Tenn. J. Bus. L. 83,
8990 (2011).
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precise nature of the duty to negotiate in good faith, and uncertainty
70
about the appropriate remedy for breach of that duty. Then he gives
students a very simple hypothetical transaction (the contemplated sale of
a car) and asks students to draft a nonbinding letter of intent. He does
not expect first-year students to draft “a perfect or even serviceable
document,” but looks to see whether they understand the basic difficulties
and whether they drafted language that attempts to “avoid the pitfalls
71
reflected in the caselaw.” That is, the opinions do not provide any “rules”
per se, but the narratives illustrate problems that parties and courts
encounter in this transactional context. Saiman shows his students that a
good transactional lawyer must be familiar with the issues that have proven
to be troublesome, and attempt to address them ex ante through planning
72
and drafting. This is a far cry from Langdell’s inductive case method.
An even simpler example of a transactional perspective on a judicial
opinion is to ask whether the losing party in a case might have avoided—
or, more precisely, reduced the probability of—an adverse decision via
good drafting. Some simple examples: even though it is not necessarily
determinative, it would be wise to add an integration clause if you want
to limit a contract to the terms of a written agreement, and it would be
foolish to label a stipulated damages provision a “penalty” clause. As in
Saiman’s example, the point is not to craft the ideal language, but to
demonstrate how business interests can be furthered, and the likelihood
of disputes reduced, by careful planning informed by knowledge of legal
issues (which does not necessarily consist of “rules”).

Conclusion
I am optimistic about the value of casebooks in legal education, but
the reader should take my optimism with a grain of salt. The same factors
that fueled resistance to the original case method are likely to contribute
to its persistence: “Those [professors] who have . . . attained, financially,
a professional position under the older methods, may hesitate in
sanctioning the innovation which retires any method by which they
73
acquired affluence.” Although I am not a casebook author, I acquire my
“affluence” (such as it is) from teaching out of casebooks. My practice
experience is nearly two decades old. As noted above, the case method
was closely related to the larger shift from part-time practitioner-teachers
to full-time academics. Thus, when the case method was introduced, the
practitioners who taught law part-time at for-profit schools stood to be

70. Id. at 90.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 91.
73. S. Stanwood Menken, Methods of Instruction at American Law Schools. II. Columbia College, in
the City of New York, Colum. L. Times, Mar. 1893, at 168, quoted in Kimball, supra note 10, at 228.

J - Joo_12 (TEIXEIRA) - 899 (Do Not Delete)

914

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

5/20/2015 11:35 PM

[Vol. 66:899
74

replaced by full-time non-practicing academics at universities. A new
shift away from casebooks and back toward practice-oriented instructors
would require at least a partial reversal of that process. All of this has
happened before . . . and it may all happen again.

74. Id.

